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ABSTRACT 
It has been shown that delayed consumable rewards are discounted to a higher 
degree than money, which has been referred to as the “domain effect”. Until now the 
effects of reward type on temporal discounting (TD) have mainly been studied in 
adults. Although there is evidence that children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) tend to show steeper TD of money than typically developing peers 
or children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), it remains untested whether the 
domain effect is also seen in children with ADHD and ASD. To explore this we 
compared TD of children (8-16y) with ADHD, ASD and typically developing 
controls with five different reward types. Seventy-two participants with ADHD, 69 
with ASD and 130 controls performed two hypothetical TD-tasks: a monetary TD-
task and a TD-task with one of four alternative rewards (material rewards, rewarding 
activities, food, social rewards). TD was seen for all reward types, but the rate of 
discounting was steeper for food, praise and rewarding activities compared to money, 
and for food and praise compared to material rewards. For the ADHD and control 
groups, but not the ASD group, money and material rewards were equally highly 
discounted. High correlations between TD of money and of activities, food and 
material rewards were found. In conclusion, a domain effect was observed in typically 
developing children, as well as in children with ADHD or ASD, although the pattern 
was somewhat different for ASD children. Despite this domain effect, there is also 
evidence for a domain-general aspect in TD.  
Keywords: temporal reward discounting, domain effect, ADHD, autism 
spectrum disorder, reward processing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The decrease of subjective-reward value that occurs as a function of increasing 
delay is referred to as temporal discounting (TD; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). TD is 
a natural phenomenon that can be observed in both humans and animals (Green & 
Myerson, 2004). TD is affected by a range of characteristics of individuals, such as IQ 
(de Wit, Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007; Olson, Hooper, Collins, & 
Luciana, 2007) and age (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Scheres et al., 2006). It 
appears altered in a number of mental health conditions (Ahn et al., 2011; Bickel & 
Marsch, 2001; Reynolds, 2006). Steeper TD has been associated with impulsivity and 
hyperactivity (Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, Fletcher, & Metevia, 2001; Critchfield & 
Kollins, 2001; Scheres, Lee, & Sumiya, 2008). Individuals with attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) show higher rates of TD of money, preferring 
immediate (monetary) rewards over larger delayed rewards to a greater extent than 
typically developing controls (Barkley et al., 2001; Demurie, Roeyers, Baeyens, & 
Sonuga-Barke, 2012; Marco et al., 2009; Paloyelis, Asherson, Mehta, Faraone, & 
Kuntsi, 2010; Scheres, Tontsch, Thoeny, & Kaczkurkin, 2010; Sonuga-Barke, Taylor, 
Sembi, & Smith, 1992; Wilson, Mitchell, Musser, Schmitt, & Nigg, 2011). This has 
been regarded as evidence for a constitutional tendency to prefer immediate over 
delayed rewards even when the delayed reward is larger, which has been referred to 
as higher trait time preference in ADHD (Sonuga-Barke & Fairchild, 2012). Other 
accounts highlight the role of altered emotional reactions to delay (“delay aversion”; 
Sonuga-Barke et al., 1992; Sonuga-Barke, Bitsakou, & Thompson, 2010) or reduced 
executive control to inhibit choices for immediate tempting stimuli (Barkley, 1997). 
Although there is evidence that alterations in TD are associated with disorders other 
than ADHD, such as substance use disorder (Bickel & Marsch, 2001) and depression 
(Ahn et al., 2011), there is also evidence of diagnostic specificity. For instance, TD of 
hypothetical monetary rewards was recently compared in children and adolescents 
with ADHD, autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing controls 
(Demurie et al., 2012). The ADHD group on average discounted rewards more 
steeply than the ASD group, who displayed the same degree of TD as their typically 
developing peers. These results are consistent with Antrop et al. (2006) who found 
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that children with ASD did not show a preference for immediate monetary rewards 
over delayed rewards, like the children with ADHD did.  
In general, there is evidence that the degree of TD varies as a function of 
intrinsic characteristics of rewards. Reward type (Charlton & Fantino, 2008; Estle, 
Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; König, 2009; Manwaring, Green, Myerson, Strube, & 
Wilfley, 2011; Odum & Rainaud, 2003) and reward magnitude (Scheres, Sumiya, & 
Thoeny, 2010; Scheres, Tontsch, et al., 2010) both have an impact on TD. Studies in 
typically developing adults suggest that the extent to which a reinforcer can be 
considered to have “permanent” (i.e., typically with greater secondary-reinforcing 
properties) or “transient” (i.e., typically primary-rewarding properties) properties can 
have an effect on TD slopes. Individuals are willing to wait longer for permanent 
rewards, such as money, than for directly consumable rewards, such as food or drinks 
(i.e., transient rewards: Estle et al., 2007; Odum & Rainaud, 2003), reflected by a 
steeper TD slope for transient compared to permanent rewards. This domain-
specificity has been referred to as the “domain effect” (Charlton & Fantino, 2008). 
Charlton and Fantino (2008) also found that food is discounted to a higher degree 
than money, but entertainment media, such as books and CDs, seem to show an 
intermediate level of TD steepness. They argue for a continuum of discounting rates 
influenced by several factors, such as primary- versus secondary-reinforcing qualities, 
possibility of immediate consumption, degree of perishability and satiability, etc. On 
the other hand, they found that individual discounting rates were highly consistent 
across reward types, depicted by positive inter-correlations between all possible pairs 
of rewards. Thus besides a domain-specific aspect, TD also has a domain-general 
aspect. The “domain effect” (Charlton & Fantino, 2008) has mainly been studied in 
typically developing adult populations.  
The evidence for increased TD in ADHD comes from TD tasks with both real 
and hypothetical monetary rewards (Barkley et al., 2001; Scheres, Tontsch, et al., 
2010; Wilson et al., 2011) and over the short and the very long term (Barkley et al., 
2001; Scheres, Tontsch, et al., 2010; but see Scheres et al., 2006 for a counter case). 
Until now, the domain effect of TD has not been investigated in an ADHD sample. 
Given the steeper TD slopes of money that can be observed in children and 
adolescents with ADHD compared to typically developing peers, the question arises 
whether the TD domain effect can be seen in these participants. Do children and 
adolescents with ADHD also show steeper TD slopes of primary, consumable and 
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transient reinforcers compared to money? In real life, children are often rewarded 
with non-monetary rewards, such as social approval, rewarding activities, sweets, etc. 
If there is no evidence for a domain effect in ADHD children’s TD slopes or a 
different domain-related pattern, then this might have implications for the choice of 
rewards in both experimental research and clinical practice. It is possible that 
individuals with ADHD respond differently to delayed money (and not to other 
delayed rewards) compared to other individuals because of its putative secondary-
reinforcing properties, compared to more primary rewards. It is possible that a lower 
reinforcing effect of money in ADHD has an impact on the domain effect of TD in 
participants with ADHD, leading to a smaller difference in TD steepness of money 
compared to primary reinforcers. In the current study, we explored this hypothesis by 
examining TD to different reward types in groups of ADHD, ASD and control 
children and adolescents.  
The current study is innovative as it is the first to investigate the TD “domain 
effect” in children with ADHD. We compared the relative impact of different reward 
types with more permanent reinforcing characteristics (money and material goods) 
versus rewards with transient reinforcing value (food, social praise, fun activities) on 
TD slopes. To get a view of the degree of disorder-specificity of potential 
abnormalities in TD processing in relation to the existence of the “domain effect”, a 
clinical-contrast group of children with ASD was included in the current study. 
Similar to children with ADHD, children with ASD show deficits in some aspects of 
motivational processing (Berger, 2006; Dawson, Osterling, Rinaldi, Carver, & 
McPartland, 2001; Koegel & Mentis, 1985). In particular, studies suggest an 
insensitivity to social reward (Demurie, Roeyers, Baeyens, & Sonuga-Barke, 2011; 
Garretson, Fein, & Waterhouse, 1990; Geurts, Luman, & van Meel, 2008; Schultz, 
2005; Scott-Van Zeeland, Dapretto, Ghahremani, Poldrack, & Bookheimer, 2010; but 
see Dichter, Richey, Rittenberg, Sabatino, & Bodfish, 2012; Kohls et al., 2012). 
However, to date, while reward-related deficits are implicated in ASD, there is no 
evidence that these relate to the processing of delayed monetary rewards (Antrop et 
al., 2006; Demurie et al., 2012). Despite this evidence, it remains unknown whether 
children with ASD do differentiate between different types of delayed rewards and 
thus manifest a “domain effect” with regard to TD. 
The current study was designed as an initial proof of concept study to establish 
whether or not the TD “domain effect” does or does not exist in children with and 
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without ADHD or ASD. We had two main research questions. First, to get a picture 
of the domain-general aspect in TD, we investigated the interrelations between TD of 
money and the alternative rewards. We expected positive correlations between the 
different TD slopes, thus that subjects with a steeper monetary TD slope would also 
show steeper TD of the alternative rewards (Charlton & Fantino, 2008). And second, 
do participants with ADHD and participants with ASD demonstrate the “domain 
effect” in TD, thus do they show less steep TD of money compared to the more 
transient, primary rewards, similar to the typically developing control group?  
 
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
2.1 Participants 
Seventy-two children and adolescents with ADHD, 69 children and adolescents 
with ASD and 130 typically developing control children and adolescents participated 
in this study. All participants were between 8 and 16 years old and had an estimated 
full scale IQ (FSIQ) of 80 or more, measured with the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children - 3rd edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991). Four subtests (similarities, 
vocabulary, block design and picture arrangement) were administered. The sum of 
these subtest scores gives a reliable estimate of the FSIQ (Grégoire, 2005). Group 
characteristics are presented in Table 1. Groups did not differ in age, estimated FSIQ 
and sex ratio. 
 
Insert Table 1  
 
The participants with ADHD and ASD were all outpatients, recruited through 
rehabilitation centres, special school services, and other agencies specialized in the 
care of children with developmental disorders. All had previously been diagnosed 
with ADHD or ASD by a multidisciplinary team according to established criteria, as 
specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition 
text revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2000). Clinical 
diagnoses were confirmed with a validated measure: the Autism Diagnostic Interview, 
Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Lecouteur, 1994), Autism Diagnostic Observational 
Schedule, Generic (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2004) or Childhood Autism Rating Scale 
(CARS; Schopler, Reichler, Devellis, & Daly, 1980) for ASD. The ADHD diagnosis 
was verified using the disruptive behaviour module (ADHD, oppositional defiant 
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disorder, ODD, and conduct disorder, CD) of the Diagnostic Interview Scale for 
Children for DSM-IV (DISC-IV; Shaffer, Fisher, Lucas, Dulcan, & Schwab-Stone, 
2000). In the ADHD sample, 21 participants met the criteria for the predominantly 
inattentive subtype, four participants met the criteria for the predominantly 
hyperactive-impulsive subtype and 47 participants for the combined subtype, 
according to the DISC-IV. Children with ASD who had comorbid ADHD or clinical 
scores for teacher and parent ratings on the Disruptive Behavior Disorder rating scale 
(DBDRS; Pelham, Gnagy, Greenslade, & Milich, 1992) were excluded from the 
sample. Participants on stimulant medication were asked to discontinue their 
medication at least 24 hours prior to testing. Fifty-two participants with ADHD were 
medicated with methylphenidate (MPH). In the ASD group, eight participants were 
medicated with MPH. Based on the results of the parent rated DBDRS, seven 
participants with ADHD and seven participants with ASD scored within the clinical 
range for ODD. Two participants with ADHD and three participants with ASD scored 
within the clinical range for CD. 
Parents and teachers completed questionnaires to obtain a broad view on the 
child’s overall functioning and possible comorbid symptoms. Parents completed the 
Child Behavior Checklist for ages 6-18 years (CBCL/6-18; Achenbach & Rescorla, 
2001), DBDRS, and Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & 
Lord, 2003). Teachers completed the Teacher’s Report Form for ages 6-18 years 
(TRF/6-18; Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001) and DBDRS. 
 
2.2 TD tasks 
Participants played two computerized tasks. In a first task, the children rated 30 
pictures of one of the four alternative rewards (food, rewarding activities, social and 
material rewards) on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not nice at all to receive this 
reward) through 4 (not nice, but also not annoying; neutral) to 7 (really nice) (see 
Figure 1). Participants were assigned to one of the four alternative reward conditions 
randomly. Each picture was shown three times, so that mean scores over the three 
ratings could be calculated. Based on this personal rating, a ranking of rewards was 
made and subjective values in percentages were calculated. The reward with a mean 
score of 4 (or the smallest value greater than 4) was equated with 0%, and the reward 
with the highest mean score was equated with 100%. By doing so, the subjective 
value of each reward for that participant was calculated, with 0% as neutral and 100% 
 8 
as most rewarding. Five of the rated rewards were selected as the alternative rewards 
in the second task.  
 
Fig. 1 Example of a trial in the first task 
 
In this second task, the actual Temporal Discounting (TD) task, participants 
were instructed to make repeated choices between a (hypothetical) small variable 
reward delivered immediately (now) and a large constant reward delivered after a 
variable delay (now, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, 1 week, 2 weeks) (see Figure 
2). This task consisted of two parts: a monetary TD task and an alternative reward TD 
task, showing the individual selection of pictures of the first task. Rewards in the 
monetary TD task were 0 €, 5 €, 10 €, 20 € and 30 €, visualized as euro notes. 
Rewards in the alternative reward TD task were the rewards from the first task with 
subjective values (by approximation) 0%, 16.67%, 33.33%, 66.67% and 100%. For 
21 control participants, 21 participants with ADHD and 19 participants with ASD it 
was not possible to single out 5 alternative rewards with these subjective values, due 
to a lack of variability in rating scores. In these participants, only the monetary TD 
task has been administered.  
Each small immediate reward was paired four times with every delay for the 
large reward, resulting in a total of 100 choice trials for each condition. Trials were 
administered in the same pseudo-random order to all participants. Left or right 
position of the delayed reward was balanced over trials. Participants responded by 
pressing button 1 when they preferred the left reward-delay combination and button 2 
for the right reward-delay combination. The order of the two versions of the TD task 
was counterbalanced across subjects.  
 
Fig. 2 Example of a trial for the material rewards and monetary TD tasks. Instruction: 
Which reward do you prefer, taking the delay into account? 
 
Children were told that they would perform several computer tasks. Instructions 
were given both verbally and on the computer screen. While children read the 
instructions on-screen, the experimenter verbally explained them what they had to do. 
Children were told that they would see two pictures of rewards and that they had to 
choose which reward they would prefer to receive. However, below the picture of the 
reward they could see when they would receive this reward. Thus, they did not only 
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have to choose what they liked the most, but they would also have to take into 
account how long they had to wait before receiving this reward. We reminded them 
that they had to take into account what they wanted and when they wanted it. There 
were no practice trials, but the experimenter repeated the instructions during the first 
three trials for all participants: e.g., “Do you prefer to receive 5 euro now or 20 euro 
in one week?”. With this procedure, every child understood what he had to do during 
the TD task. It was also carefully explained that this was a hypothetical task, thus that 
they would not receive the rewards for real, but that they had to choose which reward-
delay combination they would prefer the most. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
For the administration of the computer tasks and the intelligence test, children 
and their parents were invited in the faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences. 
To account for possible individual differences in perceived value of rewards, 
participants completed a questionnaire rating the subjective value of the monetary 
rewards used in the TD task using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not valuable 
at all, no nice reward), over 4 (neutral), to 7 (very valuable, nice reward). All 
participants and their parents signed an informed consent form, prior to testing. At the 
end of the test session participants received a reward of 15 euro, but they were not 
aware of this during testing. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the 
faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University. 
 
2.4 Data preprocessing 
Preprocessing of the data was based on procedures described by Scheres et al. 
(2006) and Critchfield and Kollins (2001). As a first step, subjective values for the 
delayed rewards were calculated for each delay. In order to determine the subjective 
values for the TD tasks, choice preferences were ordered based on delay duration and 
magnitude of the immediate reward. For each reward-delay combination, the answers 
were coded as “D” when the delayed reward was preferred and “I” when the 
immediate reward was preferred (see Table 2). Then, subjective values were 
determined for each delay by two independent raters based on the following 
procedure. The subjective value of the delayed reward was estimated by averaging the 
switch points in the ascending and descending choice sequences (Critchfield & 
Kollins, 2001). These switch points are defined as the magnitudes of the small 
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immediate reward for which the participant shows indifference in a choice against the 
large delayed reward (Scheres et al., 2006). In an ascending choice sequence, the 
large delayed reward is likely to be preferred initially (indicated by a “D” in Table 2), 
with preference shifting to the small immediate reward (indicated by an “I” in Table 
2) as its size increases. In a descending choice sequence, the small immediate reward 
is likely to be preferred when the immediate reward has a large value, but preference 
shifts towards the large delayed reward as the size of the small immediate reward 
decreases (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). In Table 2, the determination of the 
subjective values is illustrated by an example of the monetary TD task. Agreement 
between the raters was high (mean kappa = .99, range = .98-1.00). In rare cases of 
disagreement, the two ratings were compared and the disagreement was solved by 
correcting the mistake in the application of the rating rules. 
The second step in the preprocessing of the data was to calculate the area under 
the curve (AUC) for the TD functions following the procedure described by Myerson, 
Green, and Warusawitharana (2001) and Scheres et al. (2006). First, subjective values 
and delays were normalized by expressing subjective values as proportions of the 
amount of the maximum delayed reward (100% or 30 €) and expressing delays as 
proportions of the maximum delay (2 weeks). These normalized values were used as x 
and y coordinates to construct the discounting function, with delay on the x axis and 
the subjective values on the y axis. Then, vertical lines were drawn from each data 
point on the x axis to determine four separate trapezoids. The area of each trapezoid is 
equal to (x2 - x1) [(y1 + y2)/2], where x1 and x2 are successive delays and y1 and y2 are 
the subjective values associated with these delays. Using this formula, the area of 
each trapezoid was calculated and subsequently the areas were summed, which 
resulted in the total AUC. The steeper the discounting function, the smaller the total 
AUC will be. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
2.5 Statistical analyses 
First, in order to validate the TD task we tested the extent to which TD was seen 
for each of the five reward types (money, activities, material, edible and social 
rewards). To do this, a series of repeated measures ANOVAs were used to investigate 
 11 
the effects of the within-subjects factor delay on TD slopes, irrespective of group. The 
dependent variable in these analyses was the normalized subjective value of the large 
reward under 4 delays: tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, 1 week and 2 weeks. The 
subjective value of the immediate large reward was not taken into account, as this was 
a constant value equal to 1. TD occurred for all reward types although the pattern of 
effects was different (see Figure 3 for the TD slopes). For money and activities, the 
subjective value decreased as delay increased across each delay level: tomorrow > 
day after tomorrow > 1 week > 2 weeks (p < .001, p < .001 and p < .01 for money; p 
< .01, p < .05 and p < .05 for activities). For the material and edible rewards, 
discounting was seen between short delays compared to longer delays: tomorrow = 
day after tomorrow > 1 week = 2 weeks (p = 1.00, p < .001 and p = 1.00 for the 
material rewards and p = .48, p < .01 and p = .92 for the edible rewards). Finally, for 
the social rewards, discounting was seen when comparing short and increasing delays: 
tomorrow > 1 week = 2 weeks (p < .01 and p = 0.55 respectively) and day after 
tomorrow > 2 weeks (p < .01).  
As a second validity check, we tested whether, as in previous studies, ADHD 
participants had higher rates of TD for money than controls. All participants 
discounted the subjective value of money when delay-to-delivery increased. An 
ANOVA with group as factor and the AUC of the monetary TD task as the dependent 
variable showed a significant main effect of group, F(2,268) = 4.87, p < .01, ηp2= 
.04. Post hoc analyses (Bonferroni) showed that AUC of the ADHD group was 
significantly lower than AUC of the controls (p < .01) and marginally significantly 
lower than that of the ASD group (p = .09). The AUC of participants with ASD was 
not significantly different from the AUC of controls (p = 1.00). Group means are 
presented in Table 3. Group differences in TD do not seem to be due to differences in 
subjective value of the monetary reward amounts. Reward amounts (0, 5, 10, 20 and 
30€) were rated significantly different in value from each other, F(4,257) = 567.38, p 
< .001, ηp2= .90, with an increase in subjective value for each increase in reward 
value (p < .001 for all contrasts). There were no significant group differences in 
perceived value of monetary rewards, F(2,260) = .45, p = .64, ηp2= .00.  
 
 
Fig. 3 TD slopes of the different TD tasks 
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To answer our research questions, first, correlations between the AUC of money 
and the separate alternative rewards have been calculated to get a picture of the 
domain-general aspect of TD. Second, the domain effect of TD was investigated in 
the three groups with an ANOVA to compare the AUC’s of the alternative TD tasks 
and a series of repeated measures analyses to compare the AUC’s of the monetary TD 
task versus the separate alternative reward TD tasks. Group was included as a 
between-subjects factor in these analyses.  
Age and IQ were not correlated with TD measures for any type of reward and 
did not differ between the different groups working for different types of rewards. 
Therefore, in order to retain as much statistical power as possible, we did not include 
these variables as covariates in the analyses.  
 
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Are the AUC’s of different reward types correlated?  
AUC of money correlated significantly with the AUC of activities, r(53) = .49, 
p < .001, material rewards, r(50) = .51, p < .001, and food, r(52) = .41, p < .01, but 
not with the AUC of social rewards, r(55) = .17, p = .22. Correlations did not change 
when group was taken into account: partial correlations: r(50) = .49, p < .001; r(47) = 
.53, p < .001; r(49) = .41, p < .01; and r(52) = .18, p = .19 respectively. The pattern of 
correlations was very similar for the three participating groups (data available from 
first author). 
 
3.2 Exploration of the TD domain effect: Are different rewards discounted at 
different rates and are there any group differences?  
When the AUC’s of the 4 alternative rewards were compared, a significant main 
effect of alternative TD condition, F(3,198) = 4.26, p < .01, ηp2= .06, was found. 
The AUC for the more permanent material rewards was significantly higher than the 
AUC’s for the (transient) edible and social rewards (p < .01 and p < .05 respectively). 
The remaining AUC’s were not significantly different (material rewards versus 
activities: p = .13, other contrasts: p = 1.00, see Figure 3 for the TD slopes). No main 
or interaction effect of group was found.  
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Furthermore the AUC’s of money and the separate alternative rewards were 
compared. The monetary AUC was significantly higher than the AUC of rewarding 
activities, F(1,50) = 20.39, p < .001, ηp2= .29, edible rewards, F(1,49) = 20.01, p 
<.001, ηp2= .29, and social rewards, F(1,52) = 21.96, p < .001, ηp2= .30, for all 
participants. No main or interaction effects of group were found for these three 
comparisons. Between the AUC’s of monetary and material rewards, however, no 
significant difference was found, F(1,47) = 2.82, p = .10, ηp2= .06, but an interaction 
effect between reward type and group, F(2,47) = 4.08, p < .05, ηp2= .15, emerged. 
Only in the ASD group, but not in the control and ADHD groups, a significant 
difference between the AUC of material and monetary rewards could be observed, 
F(1,10) = 9.99, p < .05, ηp2= .50, with a steeper TD slope for material rewards.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Fig. 4 AUC values of the different TD tasks 
 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
The current study was the first to explore the domain-general and domain-
specific aspects of TD in participants with ADHD, ASD and their typically 
developing peers on hypothetical TD tasks across different reward types.  
First of all, strong positive correlations between TD of money, on the one hand, 
and activities, food and material rewards, on the other hand, could be observed in the 
hypothetical TD tasks. Children and adolescents (with and without developmental 
disabilities) who discount money at a high rate tend to discount activities, food or 
material rewards at a high rate too. Notwithstanding domain-specificity in TD, there 
is also evidence for a domain-general aspect of TD (see also Charlton & Fantino, 
2008; Tsukayama & Duckworth, 2010). As an exception, TD of social rewards did 
not correlate with TD of money. It is possible that intertemporal decisions with regard 
to social rewards differ from decisions on more tangible rewards. However, Tayler, 
Arantes, and Grace (2009) have compared TD of hypothetical monetary rewards and 
hypothetical relationship outcomes. Although the discounting rates differed in the two 
domains, participants seemed to make similar intertemporal choices about 
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relationships as when they were deciding about monetary outcomes. In the current 
study, the social rewards were differently operationalized as compliments by 
meaningful persons, medals that could be won, smiling faces, etc. The specific nature 
of the (social) reward seems to be important with respect to TD.  
Second, in general, TD slopes were steeper for transient rewards with stronger 
putative primary-reinforcing properties (rewarding activities, edible and social 
rewards) compared to money, with material rewards appearing more like money than 
the other rewards. Thus, the steepness of a TD slope seemed to be dependent on the 
specific nature of rewards for all participants (Estle et al., 2007; König, 2009; Odum 
& Rainaud, 2003; Tayler et al., 2009), which is in line with the “domain effect”. It is 
known that consumable rewards are discounted more steeply than money (Estle et al., 
2007; Odum & Rainaud, 2003). The current study confirms this and extends the 
finding to activities and social rewards. Rewarding activities, edible and social 
rewards are transient and cannot be collected, while money with its putative 
secondary-reinforcing properties has more permanent value. It can be collected and 
can be used to buy other goods (Estle et al., 2007). Compared to the other alternative 
rewards, material rewards also seemed to have a special status. No difference between 
TD of monetary and material rewards could be found in the control and ADHD 
groups. Moreover, material rewards were discounted less steeply than edible and 
social rewards. Just like money, material goods retain their value, since they are not 
perishable, they can be sold, etc. The tangible and collectable nature of a material 
reward seems to have an impact on its subjective value when reward delivery is 
delayed, providing it with a longer lasting rewarding effect. Evidence for the “domain 
effect” could thus be found in the three participating groups, although the pattern was 
somewhat different for the ASD participants. For activities, food and social rewards 
versus money, there was no interaction with group, indicating that all participants 
showed steeper TD for these transient rewards compared to money and thus a clear 
“domain effect”. For material rewards however, an interaction between reward type 
and group indicated that only ADHD and control participants showed similar TD 
steepness for money and material rewards. The ASD group discounted material 
rewards to a greater extent than money. One possible explanation is that the preferred 
material goods have an especially potent primary-reinforcing power because of 
specific preoccupations. If children with ASD rated objects for which they have 
preoccupations in the first computer task as their preferred rewards, then this might 
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have led to steeper TD of these material rewards compared to money. Future studies 
should further investigate this hypothesis.   
In general, we might conclude that the “domain effect” is a characteristic that 
can be observed in both clinical and non-clinical groups, but the pattern might differ 
according to personal preferences and specific problems one deals with. In line with 
this suggestion, Rasmussen, Lawyer, and Reilly (2010) found that percentage of body 
fat predicted TD of hypothetical food, but not money. Thus, the “domain effect”, 
although a robust phenomenon, seems to be influenced by individual factors too.  
Our results have significance from both theoretical and practical perspectives. 
From a scientific perspective, the fact that the ADHD sample does show a domain 
effect in TD (less steep TD for money compared to transient rewards) despite the fact 
that they have steeper TD slopes for money seems to suggest that they do understand 
the value of this secondary reinforcer. In line with this, subjective values of the 
monetary rewards were rated similarly (in a questionnaire) in the three groups. On the 
other hand we found steeper TD slopes for money in this sample, which might be due 
to (1) an overall stronger sensitivity to delay before reward (Sonuga-Barke & 
Fairchild, 2012) - implying that TD slopes of all reward types should be steeper 
compared to controls – or to (2) the fact that ADHD individuals respond differently to 
money compared to other rewards. This might be due to a less well-developed model 
of monetary-reward value, failing to distinguish the secondary-reinforcing value of 
money as opposed to other more primary and transient rewards. This would imply 
that only monetary TD slopes are steeper compared to typically developing peers. 
However, only by investigating group differences in TD with different reward types, 
one can test these hypotheses. However, we were not able to do this in the current 
paper given limited sample sizes for the separate non-monetary reward types and thus 
put it forward as a challenge for future studies. From a practical point of view, 
although using money in TD tasks has the advantages of being easy to administer and 
accurately quantifiable (Hinvest & Anderson, 2010), the ecological validity and 
generalizability of the research results with monetary TD tasks may be limited 
because we do not know whether these generalize to other reward types. The finding 
of a domain-general aspect of TD however suggests that there might be at least some 
degree of generalizability. Moreover, in the context of education and parenting, 
rewards with transient and primary-reinforcing qualities are more frequently used. To 
understand TD (and ADHD and ASD) in the real world, we investigated the domain 
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effect of TD by comparing the effects of delay-to-delivery for different reward types 
with permanent and stronger secondary-reinforcing characteristics versus those with 
more transient value, such as enjoyable activities and tasty food. This study is only a 
first step in the direction of a more comprehensive understanding of how TD 
translates into daily decision making. 
Based on our results, we can formulate some implications and directions for 
future research. First, although TD tasks may not be used diagnostically, hypothetical 
monetary TD tasks can be used in assessment procedures to shed light on the 
functional impairments of children with ADHD with regard to delay aversion and to 
strive for the best individually-tailored treatment planning (Karalunas & Huang-
Pollack, 2011). Second, it would be interesting to investigate the neural basis of TD 
and its development in both clinical (ADHD and ASD) and typically developing 
samples with neuro-imaging techniques, such as fMRI or event-related potentials.  
Although the findings above are innovative and enlarge our insight into TD of 
different reward types in children and adolescents with and without developmental 
problems, there are some limitations that should be acknowledged when interpreting 
the results of this study. First, this study was not powered statistically to test for 
between-group differences in TD slopes of alternative rewards, given the limited 
sample sizes of the separate non-monetary reward conditions. Future studies could 
include larger samples per alternative reward or administer different alternative 
reward TD tasks to all subjects.  
Second, in the current study we did not screen for receptive language problems, 
which are often seen in ASD (Stefanatos & Baron, 2011). Language problems might 
affect the degree of understanding the task instructions and can thus alter test results. 
All participants in the current study seemed to understand the task instructions and 
were able to engage in a mutual conversation. Nevertheless, it might be interesting to 
take language skills into account in future TD studies.  
Third, although the alternative rewards for the TD task were selected based on 
individual ratings, we did not directly compare the subjective values of money and the 
alternative rewards for each subject. Tsukayama and Duckworth (2010) suggest that 
steeper TD slopes can be found for rewards that are desired and enjoyed more than 
others. In their opinion, temptation explains at least partly domain-specific TD. A 
person who is really tempted by candies might show steeper TD for candies compared 
to a less preferred reward. However, Chapman (1996) found that domain-specificity 
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of discounting rates persists even after matching the outcomes for utility and 
subjective value. Nevertheless, future research should take temptation toward the 
presented rewards and individual preferences for different reward types into account.  
Fourth, the hypothetical TD tasks were not validated in a pre-study. We 
performed two validity checks in the current study. First of all, in line with previous 
studies in adult samples (Estle et al., 2007; König, 2009; Odum & Rainaud, 2003; 
Tayler et al., 2009), we found subjective values of all rewards to decrease when 
reward-to-delivery increased. It seems that TD can be seen with a range of different 
hypothetical rewards in child and adolescent samples. These results open possibilities 
for future research as they point out that different hypothetical rewards can be 
employed in TD tasks, adapted for use in children and adolescents with and without 
developmental disorders. Second, TD slopes of money were compared in the three 
participating groups. We found a difference in TD of monetary rewards between 
children and adolescents with ADHD on the one hand and typically developing 
children and adolescents (and a trend for the children and adolescents with ASD) on 
the other hand. Steeper TD slopes of monetary rewards in ADHD are a robust finding 
(Barkley et al., 2001; Demurie et al., 2012; Paloyelis et al., 2010; Scheres, Tontsch, et 
al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2011) and have been linked to the trait time preference 
(Sonuga-Barke & Fairchild, 2012) and delay aversion (Sonuga-Barke et al., 1992) 
attributed to children with ADHD. Functional magnetic resonance imaging research 
shows that more impulsive individuals show greater neural deactivations to the delay 
of future rewards in the mesial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the posterior 
parietal cortex, suggesting that they show greater (negative) sensitivity to longer 
delays before delivery of future rewards (Ballard & Knutson, 2009). The delay related 
characteristics of monetary reward processing may be considered as a specific 
characteristic of ADHD. Steep TD of monetary rewards seems to be a trait-like 
characteristic that is at least partly attributable to genetic differences in the 
dopaminergic system (Peters & Büchel, 2011). Participants with ASD did not show a 
steeper monetary TD slope compared to typically developing participants. These 
results are consistent with those of Antrop et al. (2006) and Demurie et al. (2012) who 
found no evidence for delay aversive behaviours or steeper monetary TD in ASD. 
Unfortunately, due to limited sample sizes and power issues, group effects could not 
be investigated for the alternative rewards.  
Fifth, surprisingly age and IQ did not correlate with the AUC values. However, 
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TD has been found to be associated with these individual characteristics by many 
others. First, age effects on TD have been found consistently in both real and 
hypothetical monetary TD tasks (Green et al., 1994; Olson et al., 2007; Scheres et al., 
2006; Steinberg et al., 2009). However, Reynolds (2006) suggests that real TD tasks 
may be better suited for use with children because the choices are less abstract 
compared to hypothetical TD tasks. It is possible that a real TD task would have been 
more sensitive to age effects. Future studies should further investigate this issue. 
Second, in their review, Shamosh and Gray (2008) reported that even in hypothetical 
TD tasks correlations between TD and intelligence have been observed. Although the 
relation between TD and intelligence is often regarded as well established, Barkley et 
al. (2001) also found no effect of IQ level (average or below versus above average) on 
TD. Maybe our null finding can be related to our measure of IQ. We estimated full 
scale IQ on the basis of four subscales of the WISC-III, but we were not able to 
extract an estimate of the verbal and performal IQ. Olson et al. (2007) suggested that 
the association between IQ and TD is driven solely by verbal aspects of intelligence. 
It would have been better if we had included (estimates of) both performance and 
verbal, as well as full scale IQ scores.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, in the current study TD slopes of transient rewards (food, praise 
and rewarding activities) were steeper than the TD slopes of more permanent rewards 
(money and material rewards). This specific domain effect pattern could be observed 
in typically developing and ADHD participants. Participants with ASD showed a 
slightly different domain effect with a less steep TD slope of money compared to all 
alternative rewards (thus also for material rewards). Furthermore, individual 
discounting rates were consistent across reward types, as high interrelations between 
TD of money on the one hand and activities, food and material rewards on the other 
hand could be found. We hope that the results of this study can be of help in evolving 
to a better understanding of the effects of delay on daily decision-making processes. 
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Highlights 
 
- Domain-specific and domain-general temporal discounting (TD) was 
investigated in children with ADHD or ASD. 
- TD was seen for all reward types.  
- TD rate differed between transient and more permanent rewards.  
- A domain effect was observed in controls, children with ADHD and those 
with ASD.  
- Evidence for a domain-general aspect in TD was also found.  
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Fig. 1 Example of a trial in the first task 
 
 
 
    
Fig. 2 Example of a trial for the material rewards and monetary TD tasks. Instruction: 
Which reward do you prefer, taking the delay into account? 
 
 
How nice do you think it is to receive this reward? 
1  –  2  –  3   –  4  –  5  –  6  –  7 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Fig. 3 TD slopes of the different TD tasks 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 AUC values of the different TD tasks  
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Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of the sample 
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Note: FSIQ: full scale intelligence quotient, SCQ: Social Communication Questionnaire, DBDRS: 
Disruptive Behavior Disorder rating scale, IA: inattention subscale scores, H/I: hyperactive/impulsive 
subscale scores 
 
 
 30 
Table 2. Data of one participant on the monetary TD task, example of the calculation 
of subjective values of the delayed rewards 
 Delay to large reward (30 €) 
Immediate reward 
 Now Tomorrow 
The day after 
tomorrow 1 week 2 weeks 
0 euro DDDD DDDD DDII DDDD DDDI 
5 euros DDDD DIII IIII DDII IIII 
10 euros DDDD DIII IIII DDII IIII 
20 euros DDDD DIII DIII IIII IIII 
30 euros DDDD DDII DDII IIII IIII 
      
Switch points – ascending 30 3.33 0 5 1.66 
Switch points – descending 30 30 30 10 1.66 
Subjective value  30 16.66 15 7.5 1.66 
Note: D: preference for the large delayed reward; I: preference for the immediate 
reward. For each delay, the subjective value is the mean of the ascending switch point 
where the choice preference switches from “D” to “I” and the descending switch point 
where the choice preference switches from “D” to “I”.  
 
 
Table 3. Mean AUC and standard deviations for the TD tasks 
 Controls ADHD group ASD group 
AUC values M SD n M SD n M SD n 
Monetary reward .62 .27 130 .49 .31 72 .60 .28 69 
Alternative rewards           
 - Activities .33 .27 23 .46 .29 14 .46 .27 16 
 - Material reward .58 .27 26 .58 .31 13 .47 .34 11 
 - Edible reward .40 .26 31 .33 .25 12 .32 .18 9 
 - Social reward .35 .28 29 .28 .25 12 .51 .22 14 
 
 
 
 
